When optimal policies for governments are studied in economics, social welfare functions are often used, but the functions are typically unobservable. This paper estimates the social welfare function of Japan's central government from FY 1955 to 2010. We assume that the central government determines its subsidies to the local governments of prefectures to maximize a social welfare function, which is assumed to be a weighted sum of the utility of a representative resident of each prefecture.
Introduction
A government's policy reflects the government's preferences, which are typically unobservable. However, if the government determines its policy by maximizing a social welfare function, we can estimate this function by using the chosen policy as the revealed preference of the government.
We focus on Japanese central government's preferences for local governments. Our purpose is to determine the social welfare function of the central government and to investigate the determinants of the weight the central government attaches to each local government. We assume that the social welfare function is a weighted sum of each prefecture's utility, whose form is given by the natural logarithm of the per-capita prefectural income. Our approach is the same as that of Iritani and Tamaoka (2005) , that is, to calculate the weight the central government attaches to each of the 47 prefectures in the country, from the amounts of subsidies paid to the prefectures, which are assumed to be optimally determined by the central government. By using data, Iritani and Tamaoka (2005) show that the central government gives more weight to urban areas. Since urban areas are typically populous areas, we investigate the relation between the weights and the populations of prefectures. We find that their correlation coefficient is approximately 1. This implies that approximately, the relation between weights and populations is linear.
We also show that the weight given to a prefecture by the central government equals approximately its population share in the country. Japanese local public financial system has been said to equalize fiscal revenues of local governments.
According to DeWit and Steinmo (2002) , the average of per-capita revenues after redistribution of the five lowest-taxed prefectures (rural areas) is higher than that of the five highest-taxed prefectures (urban • The right figure provides a detailed view of the lower-left portion of the left figure.
• The lines in these graphs are regression lines.
areas). Hence the system is said to be transferring excessively to rural areas. For example, DeWit and
Steinmo (2002) write, "the system clearly 'over-equalizes', as it leaves Japan's rural areas with a much higher index of per-capita revenues than the urban areas, a phenomenon that is not evident in the other countries" (171). Akai, Sato and Yamashita (2003) write about local allocation tax, which is a fiscal transfer used for intergovernmental fiscal adjustments, saying, "the status quo that the amount of transfer of local allocation tax is in excess, and interregional redistribution is gone too far is common sense among critics and supporters of local allocation tax" (22) . This characteristic can be explained by the utilitarian social welfare function. If the central government has the utilitarian social welfare function, the central government tries to equalize per-capita consumption. For per-capita consumption to be equalized across prefectures, rural areas, where per-capita income is low, need more fiscal transfers than urban areas.
Hence the amounts of per-capita fiscal net revenues after redistribution are higher for rural areas than for urban areas.
We now discuss two issues of our basic model. First, we consider the gap between populations and weights. To do so, we investigate some features of prefectures where the gap between the weight and the population is large. We consider the number of National Diet members in each prefecture. 3 The reason is as follows. Fukui and Tottori prefectures, whose weight-population ratios are respectively the second 3 The National Diet is Japan's bicameral legislature.
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and the third highest of the 47 prefectures, also have many Diet members: the ratios of the number of Diet members to the population in these prefectures are respectively the fourth highest and the highest of all prefectures. On the other hand, Kanagawa and Chiba prefectures, which have the third lowest and the lowest weight-population ratios, respectively, also have low ratios of Diet members to population:
Diet member to population ratios in these prefectures are respectively the second lowest and the sixth lowest. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that the Diet member to population ratio is a determinant of the weight.
Regression analysis for FY 2010 and other years indeed shows that the Diet member to population ratio significantly explains the gap between weights and populations. 4 Interestingly, the estimation implies that, in FY 2010, the weight attached by the central government to an Upper House member is approximately 136680 times that to an ordinal resident.
Second, we consider inter-prefectural trades, which are not considered in Iritani and Tamaoka. We extend their model to include domestic trades between prefectures. The extended model implies that the weight on a prefecture also depends positively on the prefecture's net export. This implies that if two prefectures have the same population, the prefecture with greater net export is given greater weight from the central government.
Related Literature
There are many studies that estimate governments' preferences. Standard ways to estimate weights in a social welfare function are the following two methods: one is to invert the optimization problem and explicitly calculate the weights using data. The other is to estimate the parameters of the social welfare function by using optimality conditions and econometric methods. Henderson (1968) empirically estimates local governments' preferences between public and private expenditures.
In agricultural economics, a political preference function is often used to analyze the influence of pressure groups. 5 For example, Lianos and Rizopoulos (1988) study Greek cotton market and estimates preferences of agricultural policy makers. Salhofer, Hofreither, and Sinabell (2000) estimate political weights on Austrian farmers, consumers, and taxpayers.
4 Similar results are obtained for FYs 1995 FYs , 2000 FYs , 2005 FYs , and 2010 , but not for other years. 5 See, for example, Bullock (1994) .
Much of the literature that estimates social welfare weights considers equality among income groups or regions. Bourguignon and Spadaro (2012) , Mattos (2008) , and Bargain and Keane (2010) consider social welfare weights implied by the actual income-tax system. These papers consider a weight on each income group. Bourguignon and Spadaro (2012) invert Mirrlees (1971) and Saez's (2002) optimal taxation problems and calculate weights on income groups in France. They show that the weight on a high-income group is negative, concluding that the social welfare function is not Paretian. Mattos (2008) uses the method of Bourguignon and Spadaro (2012) to calculate weights for the US and Brazil. He shows that the Brazilian social welfare function is utilitarian with approximately equal weights on income groups. Bargain and Keane (2010) also use the method of Bourguignon and Spadaro (2012) to study Irish government's preferences. In the literature of indirect tax, for example, Ahmad and Stern (1984) show a way to calculate social welfare weights and calculate the weights on income groups implied by Indian tax system. They show that some of the calculated weights are negative and hence a Pareto improving tax reform is possible. Christiansen and Jansen (1978) study Norwegian tax system. Using the optimality condition and a nonlinear least square method, they estimate the parameters of the social welfare function.
On the other hand, by using data for the distribution of public services among regions, Behrman and Craig (1987) estimate the parameter of government's inequality aversion among regions. Iritani and Tamaoka (2005) consider redistribution of financial resources to each local government and calculate the weights on local governments.
The present paper shows that Japanese social welfare function is utilitarian with identical weights on all residents. As mentioned above, Mattos (2008) shows that Brazil also has a utilitarian social welfare function. However, Mattos considers weights on income groups. The present paper considers weights on local governments. To the best of our knowledge, no paper, except for Iritani and Tamaoka (2005) , studies social welfare weights on local governments.
To explain the gap between weights and populations, the present paper also investigates the influence of Diet members on subsidies. In the literature of political economy, Doi and Ashiya (1997) verify whether Diet members in the ruling party influence subsidies. They empirically show that prefectures with more Diet members in the ruling party receive more subsidies. Doi and Ihori (2002) investigate the influence of local interest groups on government's expenditures during Japanese fiscal reconstruction process by analyzing a dynamic game among local interest groups, and show empirically that after 1995, local interest groups influence the central government's expenditure to prefectures.
Preferences of Central Government

Calculation of Weights
In this section, we calculate the weights that the central government gives to prefectures using the method developed by Iritani and Tamaoka (2005) , who calculate the weights based on the amounts of subsidies paid by the central government to prefectures. 6 First, we explain the model of Iritani and Tamaoka (2005) . The disposable income of each prefecture is defined as
where t i is the national tax rate in prefecture i, and m i is the multiplier for the expenditure within the prefecture. Thus, one unit of expenditure in prefecture i generates m i units of income in the prefecture. The social welfare function of the central government is a weighted sum of prefectural welfare, and its maximization problem is given by
where α i is the weight on prefecture i, and s (0 < s < 1) is a fixed percentage of the expenditure of the central government spent for local governments. Solving this maximization problem yields
where
6 In Iritani and Tamaoka, weights are called welfare positions. 7 For example, P i includes public spending by the central government for the prefecture excluding the fiscal transfer to the prefecture, and the local government's spending financed with local bonds.
8 For details on the data, refer to Appendix C. 9 For the derivation, see Appendix A.
Equation (2) 
Thus the effective price of S k is 1 − st k m k . The price is less than unity since one unit of subsidy given to prefecture k generates t k m k units of tax revenues and a fraction s of them becomes available for subsidies. Now, consider two prefectures i and j such that t i m i > t j m j . Then since the price (or marginal cost) of subsidies to i is lower than that to j, it must be that, at the optimal choice of subsidies, the marginal benefit of subsidies to i is also lower than that to j. With the logarithmic social welfare function, the marginal benefit of subsidies to i is given by α i /E i . Thus if E i = E j , we have α i < α j , which explains the negative relation between α i and t i m i .
We calculate the values of α i using equation (2) and the data of subsidies. 10 The result is shown in Table 1 . Iritani and Tamaoka (2005) note that prefectures that are given high values of α i are major metropolitan areas, such as Tokyo, Kanagawa, and Osaka. Indeed, as shown in Table 1 , whose bottom rows compare the average α i between major metropolitan areas and the other areas, the average α i is higher for major metropolitan areas (i.e., prefectures with * in the table). This is also clear from a test of the difference between means (Welch's t-test) reported in the last row.
To see why the central government gives more weights on major metropolitan areas, the next section examines the determinants of the weights.
Determinants of Weights
To investigate the determinants of the weights, we perform regression analysis using two possible factors:
the population and the size of land for each prefecture. The estimation equation is as follows: FY 1955 FY 1965 FY 1975 FY 1985 FY 1990 FY 1995 FY 2000 FY 2005 FY 2010 • The * represents prefectures that contain a major metropolitan area or central city as defined by Statistics Bureau of Japan (2005).
• Av of * added is the average of the weights for prefectures with *.
• Welch's t-test is a test of the difference between the means of prefectures with * and those without *.
• With the two-sided test, the differences are statistically significant at the 1% level for all FYs. The estimation uses OLS, where the White robust standard error is in parentheses andR 2 is the corrected coefficient of determination. Because of a data constraint, the sample size is 47 for FYs 1975 -2010 and 46 in FYs 1955 and 1965 . With the two-sided test, individual coefficients with *, **, and *** are statistically significant, respectively, at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
whereN i is the fraction of the population in prefecture i and area i is the land size of the prefecture.
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The result is shown in Table 2 . Observing this result, we find that the population, and not other factors, is significant for all years. Table 3 shows the weight and the population share for each prefecture. The table also indicates that the weight on a prefecture is explained considerably by the population. 
This says that the social welfare function is a weighted sum of a utilitarian function with identical weights on individuals and a weighted sum of prefectural utilities. According to Table 2 , h = 0.979 in FY 2010.
11 For details on the data, refer to Appendix C. 12 Table 3 shows the data for FY 2010. We omit the data in other years because they are similar to those in FY 2010. Since the sum of the weights is normalized to one, 1 In section 2, we confirm that α i ≈N i . If the central government has a utilitarian social welfare function with identical weights on all individuals, the ratio α i /N i is identical for all i. The ratio α i /N i can be interpreted as the weight on the entire population of prefecture i since the social welfare function is
, where u i is the utility of a resident in prefecture i. As Table 4 shows, α i /N i is not identical across the prefectures. That is, there is a gap between weights and population shares. To explain the gap, this section considers the number of members in the Diet (Japanese national assembly) 13 In this section, we ignore the non-negativity condition of subsidies. The non-negativity condition is important since in FY 2010, for example, the local allocation tax for Tokyo, which is included in S Tokyo , was 0. This suggests that the subsidy for Tokyo might have been a corner solution in that year. However, the local allocation tax is only one of many kinds of subsidies. In fact, Tokyo did receive a positive amount of subsidies in that year. Since the central government can adjust the total amount of subsidies to Tokyo, we cannot say that the subsidy for Tokyo was a corner solution. and n ji is the number of Diet members in prefecture i belonging to House j ( j = u, ℓ).
To verify the hypothesis that the vote value influences the weight, we estimate the following equation:
The result of regression is shown in Table 5 . As it shows, γ upper is significant in FY 2010. The estimated FY 2010) where N = ∑ n i=1 N i . This equation implies that the weight on an individual resident differs between the general public and Diet members.
14 The weight on an ordinary resident is 0.750, while the weight on a member of the Upper House is 102510 and that on a member of the Lower House is 54778. Thus the weight on a member of the Upper House is more than 136680 times larger than that on an ordinal resident.
This suggests that the central government gives more weights to Diet members than to the general public.
In addition, the estimation also implies that the weights on Lower House members are smaller than those on Upper House members. This suggests that the members of the Upper House have larger influences on inter-prefectural redistribution.
The OLS results for other years are also shown in Table 5 . They suggest that the value of a vote has been a significant variable in recent years. Before 1995, the value of a vote did not influence the gap between weights and populations. Hence, we conclude that Diet members influenced the weights in recent years but not before 1995.
The table also shows another regularity. For 2010 For , 2000 For , 1985 For , 1965 For and 1955 
where 1955, 1965, 1975, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005 are year dummies. 17, 18 This result implies that the Diet members facing an election have more influences than other Diet members.
Discussions
Utility Function
The preceding analyses depend on the assumption that the utility function is logarithmic. As a robustness check, we here consider a utility function (Y i /N i ) η , which includes the logarithmic function ln(Y i /N i ) as a special case. Then, the equation for the weights, equation (2), changes to
The result of estimation with this equation is shown in Table 6 for η = 0.1, 0.2, . . . , 1. If η is close to 0, the result is similar to that in the logarithmic case. 15 The number of months and the terms of office are ex post. 16 The number of seats in the Diet for each prefecture varies every election year by approximately 1.45 seats per election for the Upper House and by 11.64 seats for the Lower House. 17 The estimated values of µ j are not reported to save space. 18 The result is estimated using OLS and the robust standard error.R 2 is the corrected coefficient of determination. The sample size is 421. 
0.972
The sample size is 47, the standard error is written in parentheses, andR 2 is the corrected coefficient of determinant.
Daytime Population
The preceding sections use the nighttime population of each prefecture. This is justified if the social welfare of a prefecture is given by the utilities of the residents of the prefecture. However it is possible that the government considers the utilities of the workers in the prefecture as the welfare of the prefecture.
Let us then consider the daytime population of each prefecture. The OLS result with daytime populations is as follows: 
Expenditures and Weights
From Equation (2), we see that the weight α i is heavily dependent on the amount of expenditure E i = 
That is, the weight on a prefecture α i is also proportional to the expenditure E i on the prefecture. This implies that E i is also proportional to the population N i of the prefecture.
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This suggests another hypothesis, which is that the central government is actually equalizing per-capita expenditures E i /N i between the prefectures, since this also implies proportionality between weights and populations.
Under the hypothesis, the central government's problem is given by
If the solution is interior, E i /N i = k for all i, where k is constant. Then, the weight α i is given by The first-order condition of problem (8) yields
This implies that the
In the data, S i > 0 and 1 > st i m i for all i. Thus the left-hand side of inequality (9) must have the same sign for all i. Since the second term of the left-hand-side of (9) 
Extension: Inter-Prefectural Trades
This section extends the model of Iritani and Tamaoka (2005) to include trades between prefectures. To do so, we define the prefectural income X i by X i = C i + E i + Ex i − Im i , where C i is the total consumption by residents in prefecture i, Ex i is the amount of export from prefecture i, and Im i is the amount of import into prefecture i. We assume that the consumption, export, and import are endogenously determined by 21 Between other pairs of years, the coefficient of correlation of Dv i is as follows: 0.905 between FYs 2009 and 2008; 0.952 between FYs 2008 and 2007; 0.972 between FYs 2007 and 2006; and 0.968 between FYs 2006 and prefectural income. Let C ji be the amount of prefecture i's consumption of prefecture j's products. Then, we can write
We also assume that C ji = σ ji X i , where σ ji is prefecture i's (constant) marginal propensity to consume the products of prefecture j. Substituting it into X i = ∑ j C i j + E i yields
Rewriting this in matrix form yields X = (X 1 , . . . , X n )
is an identity matrix and Σ = (σ i j ).
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Then, the maximization problem is given by
Solving this yields
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier. To see the intuition of the equation, recall that X i is determined by the system of equations (10), where
. Summing up the equations (10) for all i yields
Thus the effective price of X i is 1 − ∑ j σ ji − st i . On the other hand, the marginal benefit of X i is α i /X i under the logarithmic social welfare function, which explains the first-order condition (12).
The OLS estimation result is shown in Table 7 . It shows that the weights are explained by population shares. However, the coefficients of determination are relatively small after FY 2000. We thus examine other determinants of the weights. Since (12) is equivalent 
E j is equal to the weight α i without inter-prefectural trades given in (2), which is, by the previous results, approximately equal to the population share. Thus (13) implies that, with inter-prefectural trades, the weight on a prefecture is determined by its population share and net export.
In the ordinal Keynesian model, where balance i is the fiscal surplus of prefecture i, that is, tax revenue minus expenditure for the local government of prefecture i. were transferred from the center to local governments. That is, the central government reduced national tax and increased local governments' authority over local tax. This reform is unfavorable to prefectures with a small fiscal surplus since they can no longer depend on fiscal transfer from the center. On the other hand, it may be beneficial to prefectures with a large fiscal surplus since it increases the amount of resources that they can use at their discretion. If this reform is considered as a change of weights on local governments, it explains our regression result that, after 2005, the central government gives greater weight to prefectures with a larger fiscal surplus.
Concluding Remarks
This paper shows that the weight that the central government attaches to a prefecture approximately equals the fraction of the population in the prefecture. This implies that Japanese central government uses a utilitarian social welfare function with approximately equal weights on all residents. Japanese local financial systems are said to achieve regional equity (e.g., Mochida (2001) and Iqbal (2001) ). Our result gives a support on this view.
Although the weight on a prefecture approximately equals its population share, there is a gap between weights and population shares. This gap is significantly explained by the value of an individual vote, particularly after 1995. Before 1995,R 2 in Table 5 is relatively low. It is worth mentioning that, in 1994, the Japanese election system was revised. This may suggest that the election system after 1994 gives Diet members more incentives to influence interregional redistribution. Doi and Ihori (2002) also show that the amounts of subsidies are influenced by local interest groups after 1995. Our result is consistent with theirs.
The above results are obtained in our basic model without inter-prefectural trades. In the extended model that includes inter-prefectural trades, the weight on a prefecture has an additional term that is proportional to the prefecture's net export. A prefecture with a large amount of net export is typically a productive area (like Tokyo and Osaka). Our result may suggest that the central government gives more weight to more productive prefectures.
A prefecture with large net export typically also has a large fiscal surplus. The regression result shows Appendix A Derivation of Equation (2) In this section, we derive Equation (2) from the maximization problem (1). This paper assumes that the timing of the central government's decision is as follows.
are respectively local tax revenue and local tax rate to maximize residents' utility. In stage 3, residents' consumption C i is given by
is the national tax rate,c i is the marginal propensity to consume, and X i is the prefectural income.
In stage 2, the central government solves
are already determined in stage 1, we can consider these variables as given. This problem is the same as the problem (1). By the first-order condition,
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier. In the ordinal Keynesian model, the prefectural income is defined as
. Therefore, we can rearrange the first-order condition as
Normalizing α i to satisfy ∑ 47 j=1 α j = 1 provides Equation (2).
Appendix B Derivation of Equation (12)
This section derives equation (12) by solving problem (11). By the first-order condition, That is,
The first and last equations are respectively equation (12) and (13). 
Appendix C Variable Descriptions
P i
The other public expenditure
The sum of private capital investment and private housing investment in prefecture i.
Annual Report on Prefectural Accounts.
s The ratio of expenditures to local governments to total expenditures Annual Report on Prefectural Accounts, Table 1 -2-1.
N i
The (nighttime) population share
The population of prefecture i divided by the total population.
Historical Statistics of Japan, Ch. 2, Population Census.
The daytime population share
The daytime population of prefecture i divided by the total population.
area i
The size of the area The square of the area of prefecture i divided by the total area of Japan.
Historical Statistics of Japan, Ch. 1.
balance i The fiscal surplus of prefecture i
The amount of real fiscal balance of prefecture i divided by the total sum of the absolute value of real fiscal balance of all prefectures.
Annual Report on Local Public Finance Statistics 
